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I. INTRODUCTION
Credit and debit cards have become a prominent form of payment
throughout the world. The interchange fees associated with these payment
instruments have, in some instances, seen considerable change in recent
years. In some countries, interchange fees have experienced sharp move-
ments following a period of relative stability. In other countries, they have
remained relatively steady, but significant changes may be on the horizon.
Behind many of these changes lie important, even landmark, industry
developments and regulatory and central bank rulings.
A number of key issues and controversies currently surround credit and
debit interchange fees. Most involve the rationale for and level of inter-
change fees. Typically paid by merchant acquirers to card issuers on a 
per-transaction basis, interchange fees in most countries are set by credit
and debit card networks. But in one country, Australia, the central bank is
regulating interchange fees, and in several other countries, including the
United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), the United States, the
Netherlands, Mexico, and Spain, public officials and/or the courts are 
scrutinizing and debating interchange fees.
This paper provides an overview of interchange fees. It documents inter-
change fee developments in a number of countries and provides a preliminary
analysis of possible contributing factors. The central message of the paper is
that interchange arrangements vary considerably across countries, and while
existing theory provides some insight into fee levels and movements, much
remains to be explained. A number of complex and interrelated factors, many
country-specific, play a role in interchange developments. To adequately test
existing and future theories, richer data will be required.
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 The paper is organized as follows. The following section provides back-
ground on the function of interchange fees. It explains the idea of two-sided
markets and how such markets are related to the fee structure of payments
networks. Three-party and four-party payment schemes are discussed.
Section 3 of the paper provides an overview of interchange fee develop-
ments and issues in 10 key countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, EU
cross-border, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Credit card, signature-based debit card, and PIN-
based debit card markets are addressed separately. Among the topics covered:
How do interchange fee arrangements vary across countries? How have inter-
change fees—and related fees, such as merchant discount fees and cardhold-
er fees—moved in recent years? In which countries do various network rules,
such as no-surcharge rules, honor-all-cards (HAC) rules, net-issuer rules, and
duality rules, apply?  Which countries have recently addressed or are current-
ly addressing issues and controversies? In which countries have public
authorities—competition authorities or central banks—played an active role
in interchange fee discussions?
Section 4 of the paper explores possible determinants of the level of inter-
change fees. It first reviews some of the existing economic literature on inter-
change fees and highlights some general determinants implied by economic
theory. Drawing on these insights, a preliminary examination of available
empirical data is conducted to see whether there is any evidence pointing
toward particular determinants. What emerges is a rejection of simple expla-
nations. In practice, interchange fees are determined by a multitude of fac-
tors, so to properly explain them will require a multivariate approach and
richer data sources. Finally, Section 5 offers closing remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
If all cardholders and merchants obtained their card services from a sin-
gle financial institution, there would be no need for an interchange fee. This
is the case of a three-party (or proprietary) card scheme such as those tradi-
tionally offered by American Express or Diners Club.
1 American Express,
for instance, signs up cardholders and merchants, and deals directly with
both groups. A central decision made by such a card scheme is how much
to charge cardholders versus how much to charge merchants. If one consid-
ers only the payment services offered by a proprietary card scheme (exclud-
ing revenue from the extension of credit), such schemes typically obtain a
majority of their revenue from merchants. They do this through merchant
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 fees—fees that are obtained as a percentage of the value of each card trans-
action. For instance, American Express (2004) reports that it earned 71 per-
cent of its card-related revenues from the merchant side of the business in
2004. In contrast, often cardholders pay no annual fees. Rather, cardhold-
ers are given an interest-free period over which to pay their outstanding bal-
ances, and rebates such as frequent flyer miles based on the value of their
card transactions. Consumers who do not roll over credit card debt may
therefore face a negative price for using credit cards. In the case of debit
cards, on the other hand, consumers often pay per-transaction fees.
2
These card schemes have to attract cardholders to get merchants and
merchants to get cardholders. The choice of how much to charge cardhold-
ers versus merchants is an important aspect of attracting both types of
users. Broadly speaking, card schemes will choose a structure of fees to the
respective sides that drives overall transaction demand, and ultimately
profit. Diners Club did this when it started up in 1950 by initially giving
away cards to consumers and charging merchants 7 percent of their bill
(Evans and Schmalensee, 2005a).
The issue of how much to charge each type of user is a common one in
other two-sided markets. Magazines decide how much to charge readers
versus advertisers, trading posts decide how much to charge buyers versus
sellers, nightclubs decide how much to charge men versus women, expos
decide how much to charge visitors versus exhibitors, and so on. In all
these two-sided markets, a platform seeks to attract the two sides to enable
transactions between them, and has to make a decision about how much
to charge each side.
3 The situation with card systems is fundamentally the
same one. This is obvious with a three-party scheme such as American
Express since it makes its pricing decision directly. Less obviously, a simi-
lar situation arises for four-party schemes (card associations) such as
MasterCard and Visa.
Consider the situation of a card association such as MasterCard or Visa,
which offers a branded network over which its members (issuers and
acquires) provide card services to end users. Since it does not deal directly
with consumers or merchants, the association does not get to directly
determine the fees charged to each side. If each issuer and each acquirer sets
its prices independently, the structure of prices across the two sides then
will not be something that the association chooses directly. How then can
the association determine a structure of prices as proprietary schemes or
platforms on other two-sided markets do? The answer is by setting an
interchange fee. 
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achieve a desired balance of cardholding (and usage) versus merchant
acceptance across the two sides of the market, in the same way proprietary
schemes or platforms in other two-sided markets can do directly. This pro-
vides a useful framework to think about the implications of interchange
fees in which both sides of the market (both cardholders and merchants)
are considered simultaneously. The framework contrasts with a vertically
organized view of the industry, in which issuers sell services to acquirers,
who then sell to merchants. This view misses the fact that issuers also 
service cardholders, and that the interaction of cardholders and merchants
is essential to creating a valuable service. The two-sided markets’ frame-
work highlights the fact that the interchange fee is not a price for a single
service, but instead acts as a balancing instrument.
4
To see how interchange fees can play this role, consider a particular
transaction between a consumer and a merchant using a MasterCard or
Visa card. Typically, the consumer’s card will be from a different bank than
that which the merchant utilizes. Then the interchange fee is a payment
made from the merchant’s bank (the acquirer) to the consumer’s bank (the
issuer), usually, in the case of credit cards, as a percentage of the value of
the transaction and, in the case of debit cards, often as a flat rate.
5The level
of this interchange fee is typically collectively set. 
From the point of view of acquirers, the interchange fee is a cost of pro-
viding their services to merchants. An increase in the interchange fee will
lead to an increase in acquirers’ costs for every card transaction they
process. Acquirers therefore ultimately will respond to an increase in the
interchange fee by increasing their merchant fees. This is true regardless of
whether there is a single acquirer or if there is strong competition among
different acquirers, although the rate and timing of the pass-through of
interchange fees to merchant fees can differ depending on the nature of
acquirer competition. If pass-through is less than perfect, an increase in the
interchange fee will cut into acquirers’ profits, and may make acquirers less
likely to promote the development of the particular card network. 
Similarly, from the point of view of issuers, the interchange fee is a fee
obtained for providing their services to cardholders (a payment that issuers
receive). An increase in the interchange fee will mean an increase in the fee
issuers receive for every card transaction their customers undertake. Issuers
will therefore ultimately respond to an increase in the interchange fee by
increasing benefits (for instance, rebates) to cardholders and/or decreasing
their card fees, so as to encourage more card transactions. This is true
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 regardless of whether there is a single issuer or if there is strong competition
among different issuers, although the rate and timing of the pass-through of
interchange fees to card fees can differ depending on the nature of issuer
competition. If pass-through is less than perfect, an increase in the inter-
change fee will increase issuers’ profits and may make issuers more likely to
promote the development of the particular card network.
The net effect of an increase in a card association’s interchange fee will
therefore be to increase its acquirers’ merchant fees and to decrease its
issuers’ card fees (or, equivalently, increase card benefits). With limited pass-
through of interchange fees, the net effect may also be to decrease acquirers’
profits and increase issuers’ profits. In this case, it may also lead to more pro-
motion of card services by issuers and less promotion of card services by
acquirers. To the extent that the increase in merchant fees exactly equals the
decrease in card fees, the interchange fee will change the structure of fees but
not the overall level of the issuers’ and acquirers’ fees. To the extent that the
increase in merchant fees does not match the decrease in card fees, chang-
ing the interchange fee will change the structure of fees and, at the same
time, change the overall level of the issuers’ and acquirers’ fees.
In either case, the interchange fee is the key instrument the card associa-
tion can use if it wants to achieve a particular structure of cardholder and
merchant fees, or more generally, if it wants to expand one side of the mar-
ket relative to the other. For instance, if the association and its members
want to place more emphasis on expanding cardholding and usage relative
to merchant acceptance, they will require a relatively high interchange fee.
If the association and its members want to place more emphasis on expand-
ing merchant acceptance relative to cardholding and usage, they will require
a relatively low interchange fee. In this sense, the interchange fee is an
instrument that card associations can use if they are to achieve a desired bal-
ance of cardholding (and usage) versus merchant acceptance across the two
sides of the market, in the same way proprietary schemes or platforms in
other two-sided markets can do directly.
6
This is not to say that interchange fees cannot be used for other purpos-
es. As was noted above, a higher interchange fee may also increase the over-
all level of fees, for instance, if acquirers pass through all of the additional
cost of higher interchange fees but issuers keep a proportion of any increase
in interchange fee revenue.
7 If by doing so the card scheme can profitably
raise the overall level of fees, the card scheme may profit at the expense of
its customers (cardholders and merchants). Nor is it the case that card asso-
ciations will necessarily set the “right” level of interchange fees from 
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society’s point of view, an issue taken up elsewhere (Evans and
Schmalensee, 2005b; Wright, 2004). The value of the two-sided markets’
approach is that it provides a logically consistent framework to analyze
interchange fees that takes into account the demands of both sides of the
market, and it can be used to explore these other issues as well. This frame-
work will be used to analyze some possible determinants of interchange
fees in Section 4.
Before doing so, however, the following section summarizes the inter-
change environment in several countries throughout the world.
III. DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES
As noted in the preceding section, interchange fees are an integral part of
the pricing structure of credit and debit card industries. This section 
documents interchange developments and issues across a number of coun-
tries. Countries include Australia, Canada, Denmark, EU cross-border,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. These countries share some common features but also exhib-
it many differences in how interchange and related fees and rules operate
in their respective markets. In all of these countries, however, interchange
fees currently are, to varying degrees, the focus of pointed industry and
public-authority debate.
One thing all of these countries share is the increasing importance of
credit and debit cards in their overall payments system.
8 All countries have
experienced an increase in the share of credit and debit card transaction
volume in recent years (Chart 1). In Canada, Denmark, and Sweden, in
fact, credit and debit cards now account for more than half of all non-cash
transactions. Debit card usage has grown particularly rapidly in many
countries, with debit cards’ share of overall non-cash transactions doubling,
tripling, or even more in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States in just a few years. This pronounced growth in credit and
debit card usage has undoubtedly come at the expense, at least in part, of
the paper check, which has declined steadily in all areas. Debit card usage,
in particular, has probably also substituted for cash, although cash usage is
very difficult to measure and is not included in the share statistics.
The section is organized as follows. The first three subsections discuss
developments and issues in the credit, signature-based debit, and PIN-
based debit card markets separately. The discussion is guided by informa-
tion presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In these tables, the 10
individual countries are listed as rows and for each, key interchange-relat-
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Chart 1: 
Non-Cash Payment Share (Transaction Volume)
Sources: BIS (1996-2005), ECB (2000, 2001, 2004), World Bank (2003), Euromonitor (2004), Federal Reserve
System (2002, 2004), EMEAP (2002), Banco de México.
Note: Mexico debit card figures include ATM transactions.
 ed information is provided in the columns: instrument market share 
(column 3); networks operating in that country (column 4); what bodies set
interchange fees for those networks (column 5); recent movements in inter-
change fees (column 6); recent movements in merchant service charges 
(column 7); recent movements in cardholder fees (column 8); whether 
no-surcharge (column 9), HAC (column 10), net-issuer (column 11), and
duality/exclusion (column 12) rules are in force in various networks; and
finally, interchange-related issues and controversies recently or currently
under debate (column 13). The closing subsection delves more deeply into
public-authority involvement in interchange discussions, documenting,
with the aid of Table 4, actions and rulings taken by or pending before 
competition authorities and central banks in these 10 countries.
A. Credit cards
Credit cards are an important payment instrument in many of the coun-
tries under review.
9 As noted in column 3 of Table 1, they are most promi-
nent, in terms of share of overall non-cash transactions volume, in Canada,
the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Spain.
10 Column 4
shows the credit card networks operating in the 10 countries. Four-party net-
works are listed above the dotted line while three-party networks are listed
below the dotted line. Networks with an asterisk behind them are networks
available for international use only, that is, networks that issue cards to that
country’s residents for international use and are available for foreigners’ use
within the country. Another convention followed in Tables 1 through 3
relates to missing information. When a statement or attribute is not attached
to a specific network, it can be taken to hold for all networks in that coun-
try. When a statement or attribute is attached to a specific network, it applies
only to that network, and comparable information not shown for other net-
works means that such information is not available. Finally, in the tables,
“nap” denotes “not applicable” and “neg” denotes “negligible.”
Interchange fees are set under a variety of arrangements (column 5). In
some countries they are collectively set by members of the network, some-
times subject to regulatory limits; in others they are set by network manage-
ment. In one country, Mexico, they are set by members of the Mexican
Bankers Association, and in another, Sweden, they are set bilaterally. In
Demark, interchange fees are aligned with merchant service charges, which
are subject to a regulatory cap.
11
In most countries, interchange fees have declined or are declining (col-
umn 6). In some countries, this is due to recent regulation or regulatory
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Table 1: 
Credit Card
Notes:  1. In column (4), four-party networks are listed above the line while three-party networks are
listed below; "*" denotes networks that issue cards to that country’s residents for international
use and are available for foreigner’s use within the country 
2. "nap" denotes not applicable
Market Information Interchange Fees Other Fees
Recent 
Recent MSC Recent Cardholder
Region Country Share Networks Set by Whom Movements Movements Fee Movements
1 23 4 5 6 7 8
Asia Australia  22% Bankcard Bankcard MC/Visa: Declined Declined Annual Fees: 
Pacific MC collectively set by members  Increasing          
Visa  of the networks subject to Interest-Free 
Amex regulatory limits Period: Declining
Diners Rewards: Declining
JCB
North Canada  23% MC MC/Visa: collectively set  MC:  MC:
America Visa by members of the  Increased Increased
Amex networks
Diners
Mexico 10% MC MC/Visa: collectively  Declining
Visa set by members of the 
Amex Mexican Bankers Association 
(MC and Visa have the 
same rates)
U.S. 23% MC MC: set by management Increasing Increasing Annual Fees: Declining
Visa Visa: collectively set  Interest Rates: Zero




Europe EU cross- nap MC MC: collectively set by  Declining nap nap
border Visa members of the network 
Visa: collectively set by 
members of the network 
subject to regulatory 
agreement  
Denmark 1% MC MC/Visa: aligned with  Stable Stable
Visa* MSCs, which are subject 
Amex to regulatory cap
Diners
Nether- 1% MC MC: collectively set by  Declining Declining













U.K. 15% MC MC: set by management Declining Stable Annual Fees: Zero fees
Visa Visa: collectively set by  prevalent Interest 
Amex members of the network Rates: Zero introductory
Diners interest rates prevalent
JCB Rewards: Available





Region Country Surcharge HAC Net Issuer Exclusion Issues
1 2 9 10 11 12 13
Asia Australia Bankcard: No   Yes Bankcard: Yes Yes/No 1. Reserve Bank of Australia regulations 
Pacific MC: No  MC: Yes lowering credit card interchange fees and 
Visa: No Visa: Yes    eliminating credit card no-surcharge rules.
2. In light of regulation of four-party schemes,
potential shift in transaction volume to 
nonregulated three-party schemes.
Canada  MC/Visa: Yes nap MC: Yes No/ "Synthetic duality" for MC and Visa.
Mexico MC/Visa: Yes Yes MC: Yes Yes/ 1. Interchange fees have been reduced due to
a concerted effort between Banco de Mexico
and the Mexican Bankers Association.
2. Banco de Mexico has made the HAC rule 
more flexible: merchants are allowed to accept
only debit, credit, or both cards.
3. The no-surcharge rule was left intact 
because discounts are already allowed. 
U.S. MC/Visa: Yes No MC: No Yes/No 1. Wal-Mart HAC case.
2. Merchant dissatisfaction with interchange     
fee levels.   
3. DOJ-led court case eliminating MC and 
Visa exclusion rules that prohibited member 
banks from issuing American Express and 
Discover credit cards.  
4. Appearance of volume-based interchange 
fee tiers.
Europe EU cross- MC: no MC: No Visa: /Yes 1. Visa agreement to reduce cross-border
border Visa: Yes Visa: Yes interchange fees.  
2. Visa's no-surcharge and net issuer rules
left intact by EC.
3. MasterCard's interchange fees under EC review.
4. Exclusion provisions in Visa's membership 
rules under EC review.  
5. MC eliminated its no-surcharge rule.
Denmark nap MC: No Yes/No Debate over surcharging
Netherlands No nap MC: No Yes/
Spain Visa: Yes MC: No Yes/No 1. Agreements among banks, networks, 
merchants, and government agencies have led 
to reduction in interchange fees since 1999.  
A further lowering of fees is currently being 
discussed by the Ministry of Industry, the 
networks, and merchant and consumer groups.
2. There is some dissatisfaction with lack of 
transparency in fee setting. 
Sweden Visa: Yes MC: No Yes/No
U.K. No MC/Visa:  Yes/ 1. OFT announces it believes MC 
Yes interchange agreements lead to unduly high 
fees; final ruling expected summer 2005.  
2. OFT announces plans to investigate 
Visa interchange fees.STUART E. WEINER AND JULIAN WRIGHT 15
threat: Australia, Mexico, and EU cross-border. In Spain, interchange fees
have been declining as a result of a 1999 agreement among banks, net-
works, merchants, and the Ministry of the Economy.
12 A notable outlier is
the United States, where interchange fees on credit cards have been rising
in recent years. In fact, as shown in Chart 2, interchange fees in the United
States are more than double those in some other areas (Australia, EU cross-
border, and the United Kingdom). Indeed, U.S. fees were significantly
higher even before the fees in these other countries were forced down by
actual or anticipated regulation.
Although difficult to document, merchant service charge movements
appear to have tracked interchange fee movements to some extent (column
7). Cardholder fee movements have also tended to move in the expected
direction (column 8). In countries where interchange fees have declined,
for example, Australia and Spain, annual fees have increased and, in the
case of Australia, interest-free periods have shortened and rewards pro-
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, Visa Europe, MasterCard International, American Banker.
Notes: From Hayashi (2004), “A Puzzle of Card Payment Pricing: Why Are Merchants Still Accepting Card Payments?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Payments System Research working paper 04-02, p. 3. U.K. figures are estimates.
“Before” means before the rate was forced to be lowered; “after” means after the rate was lowered; “current” means as
of November 2004. In Australia, the regulation is effective for both Visa and MasterCard. The “before” and “after” rates
are the average of Visa and MasterCard electronic rates. In the EU, the European Commission made its decision on the
Visa rate for cross-border transactions only. The “before” rate is not publicly available, but the average rate was estimat-
ed at about 1 percent according to the report “Credit Card Services” by the U.K. Monopolies and Mergers Commission
and others. The “after” rate is Visa’s electronic authorization rate. In the U.K., the antitrust authority has not made a final
decision on credit card interchange rates. Therefore, the “after” rate is an expectation by industry observers. They predict
the regulated interchange rate will be between 0.35 to 0.7 percent. See, for example, The Times, May 17, 2004, and
November 11, 2004, and Financial Times, November 11, 2004. The U.S. rate is the average of Visa and MasterCard
default rates for retail stores.
Chart 2:










Australia EU  U.K. U.S.
Before regulation
After regulation
Currentgrams have become less generous. In the United States, where interchange
fees have risen, annual fees have declined, reward programs have become
more generous, and zero introductory interest rates have become prevalent.
Here, the United Kingdom appears to be something of an outlier, with
interchange fees falling but annual-fee and introductory-rate provisions
remaining relatively generous.
The 10 countries exhibit considerable variation across the principal 
categories of network rules: no-surcharge, HAC, net issuer, and
duality/exclusion rules. No-surcharge rules prevent merchants from charg-
ing customers for the use of a particular payment mechanism, in this case,
a credit card. HAC rules, as defined here, require merchants that accept a
network’s credit card to also accept that network’s signature-based debit
card, if the latter exists in a given country.
13 Net issuer rules require acquir-
ing banks to issue a minimum level of cards in order to participate on the
acquiring side of the market. Duality rules allow a bank that issues
MasterCard credit cards to also issue Visa credit cards. Finally, exclusion
rules prevent a bank that issues MasterCard or Visa credit cards from issu-
ing other credit cards, for example, American Express and Discover.
No-surcharge rules are presently in effect in Canada, Mexico, the United
States, and Sweden (column 9). They also are in effect—for Visa—for EU
cross-border and Spanish transactions. On the other hand, surcharging is
permitted in Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and, for
MasterCard, also in Spain and EU cross-border.
14
HAC rules have a particularly interesting history in the United States
(column 10). The so-called Wal-Mart case, brought by several merchants
and trade associations against Visa and MasterCard in the mid-1990s and
finally settled in 2003, eliminated Visa and MasterCard HAC rules. Net
issuer rules are in place in roughly half of the countries under review (col-
umn 11). Duality is allowed in all countries but Canada; exclusion rules
vary (column 12).
Turning to the last column of Table 1, industry participants and public
authorities in virtually all of the countries have dealt with or are currently
discussing issues and controversies surrounding credit card interchange fees
and related matters. These range from regulations or agreements lowering
interchange fees (Australia, Mexico, EU cross-border) or capping merchant
service charges (Denmark), to regulations eliminating or permitting no-
surcharge rules (Australia, EU cross-border), to merchant dissatisfaction
with interchange levels (United States, Spain, EU cross-border, United
Kingdom), to complaints or concerns over three-party network schemes
16 Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants
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(Australia, United States), transparency (Spain, EU cross-border,
Australia), and duality (Canada). Thus, there is no shortage of challenging
issues confronting the industry.
B. Signature-based debit cards
Table 2 presents information on signature-based debit cards. Signature-
based cards have an important presence in a few countries, for example, the
United States and Spain, and in other countries—Canada, Denmark, and
the Netherlands—they are essentially nonexistent (column 3). As the name
suggests, they are debit cards that require a signature, not a PIN, for
authorization. MasterCard and Visa signature debit transactions run over
MasterCard’s and Visa’s respective credit card networks. The three Spanish
signature debit card networks, Euro 6000, ServiRed, and Sistema 4B, are
stand-alone proprietary systems.
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In this subsection and the next, to keep things a little simpler, the gen-
eral terms “MasterCard” and “Visa” are used to denote the various
MasterCard and Visa signature- and PIN-based debit products. Thus, Visa
CheckCard (U.S. signature), Visa Debit (Australian signature), Visa
Electron (European PIN), and Visa Interlink (U.S. PIN) are all referred to
as “Visa,” while MasterCard MasterMoney (U.S. signature) and
MasterCard Maestro (worldwide PIN) are all referred to as “MasterCard.”
As is the case with credit cards, interchange fees on signature debit have
tended to decline in recent years (column 6), often attributable to regula-
tory action (EU cross-border), regulatory threat (Mexico), or government-
led industry agreement (Spain). Interchange fees on U.S. signature debit,
in contrast, have taken a different route. As part of the Wal-Mart settle-
ment, they were reduced by roughly a third over the period August to
December 2003, but since that time they have risen to some extent.
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Merchant service charges appear, for the most part, to have moved in the
same direction as interchange fees, although, like cardholder fee move-
ments, complete data are hard to obtain (columns 7, 8).
With the exception of Australia and the United Kingdom, signature-
based debit transactions are subject to the same no-surcharge rules as cred-
it cards in the various countries, and by definition, all HAC rules are also
the same (columns 9, 10). Net issuer and duality rules also coincide
(columns 11, 12).
A number of signature debit issues are currently under discussion (col-
umn 13). In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has proposed
lowering interchange fees and eliminating the no-surcharge and HAC rules
on the Visa signature card. In the United States, there is widespread mer-
 Table 2:
Signature-Based Debit Card
Market Information Interchange Fees Other Fees
Recent 
Recent  Recent MSC  Cardholder Fee 
Region Country Share Networks Set by Whom Movements Movements Movements
1 234 5 6 7 8
Asia Australia 21%+ Visa Visa:  collectively  Declined  Declined
Pacific set by members
of the network 
North Canada neg nap nap nap nap nap
America
Mexico 51%# MC MC/Visa: collectively Declining
Visa set by members of 
the Mexican Bankers 
Association (MC 
and Visa have the 
same rates)
U.S. 13% MC MC: set by MC  Net decline Net decline
Visa management 
Visa: collectively set 
by members of 
the network
Europe EU cross- nap MC MC: collectively set  Declining nap nap
border Visa by members of the 
network
Visa: collectively set 
by members of the 
network subject to 
regulatory agreement
Denmark neg nap nap nap nap nap
Netherlands neg nap nap nap nap nap
Spain 21% Euro 6000  Euro6000/ServiRed/ Declining Declining
MC* Sistema 4B: set their 
ServiRed own levels subject to 
Sistema 4B regulatory agreement
Visa*
Sweden 51%+ MC MC/Visa: negotiated
Visa bilaterally
U.K. 28%+ MC MC: set by S2 Card  Stable
Visa Services management 
Visa: collectively set 
by members of 
the network
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Notes:  1. "*" denotes networks that issue cards to that country’s residents for international use and 
are available for foreigner’s use within the country. 
2. "+" indicates share includes PIN-based transactions. 
3. "#" denotes share includes ATM transactions. 
4. "Nap" denotes “not applicable.”
5. "Neg" denotes “negligible.”Network Rules
Region Country No-Surcharge HAC Net Issuer Duality Issues 
1 2 9 10 11 12 13
Asia  Australia Visa: Yes Yes Visa: Yes nap Reserve Bank of Australia  
Pacific proposal to lower interchange fees
and eliminate no-surcharge and 
HAC rules on Visa signature 
debit card.
North Canada nap nap nap nap nap
America
Mexico MC/Visa: Yes Yes MC: Yes Yes 1. Interchange fees have been 
reduced due to a concerted effort 
between Banco de México and 
the Mexican Bankers Association.
2. Banco de México has made the
HAC rule more flexible:
merchants are allowed to accept 
only debit, credit, or both cards.
3. The no-surcharge rule was left
intact because discounts are 
already allowed.
U.S. MC/Visa: Yes No  MC: No Yes 1. Wal-Mart HAC case. 
2. Merchant dissatisfaction
with interchange fee levels.
3. Appearance of volume-based 
interchange fee tiers. 
Europe EU cross- MC: No  MC: No 1. Visa agreement to reduce cross-
border Visa: Yes Visa: Yes border interchange fees.
2. Visa's no-surcharge and net
issuer rules left intact by EC. 
3. MasterCard's interchange fees
under EC review. 
4. Exclusion provisions in Visa’s
membership rules under EC 
review. 
5. MC eliminated its no-surcharge
rule.
Denmark nap nap nap nap nap
Netherlands nap nap nap nap nap
Spain Euro6000: Yes MC: No Yes 1. Agreements among banks,
ServiRed: Yes networks, merchants and govern-
Sistema4B: Yes ment agencies have led to reduction
Visa: Yes  in fees since 1999. A further 
lowering of fees may result from
an April 2005 ruling by the 
Tribunal de Defensa de la 
Competencia.
2. There is some dissatisfaction 
with lack of transparency in fee 
setting. 
Sweden Visa: Yes MC: No Yes
U.K. Yes MC/Visa: Yes Yes
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chant dissatisfaction with the level of interchange fees, and in Spain, some
merchants reportedly believe merchant service charges remain too high. The
EC, meanwhile, has MasterCard’s fee policy under review, having reached
an earlier agreement with Visa for Visa to lower its cross-border fees.
C. PIN-based debit cards
Table 3 presents information on PIN-based debit cards. PIN-based cards
have a large presence in many European countries as well as in Canada,
Australia, and the United States (column 4). MasterCard and Visa operate
PIN-based systems in several of these countries; in addition, domestic sys-
tems are especially prominent in Australia, Canada, the United States,
Denmark, and the Netherlands (column 4).
17
PIN-based networks display a variety of institutional features and 
practices across countries. In Australia, for example, EFTPOS PIN debit
interchange fees are set bilaterally and, notably, are paid by the issuer to
the acquirer. In Canada and the Netherlands, interchange fees are set at
zero by Interac and Interpay, respectively. Swedish PIN interchange fees
are negotiated bilaterally. And in the United States, PIN interchange fees
are often a competitive tool for attracting issuers—the United States is
characterized by a large number of good-sized domestic networks, the
largest of which (Star, NYCE, and Pulse) compete vigorously with Visa
(columns 4, 5).
Interchange fee movements have shown varying patterns in recent years
(column 6). They have remained at zero in Canada and the Netherlands
and have been stable in Australia. In Denmark, MasterCard and Visa fees
have declined, while positive fees for Dankort transactions (the domestic
network) were introduced at the beginning of this year but have since been
eliminated again, all due to regulatory actions.
18 In the United States, PIN
interchange fees have been drifting up, as shown in Chart 3, along with
MasterCard and Visa signature debit fees.
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Market Information Interchange Fees Other Fees
Recent  Recent MSC Recent Cardholder 
Region Country Share Networks Set by Whom Movements Movements Fee Movements
1 23 4 5 6 7 8
Asia Australia 21%+ EFTPOS EFTPOS:  EFTPOS: Per-transaction
Pacific MC* bilaterally set; paid  Stable fees typical
Visa* by issuer to acquirer
North  Canada 36% Interac Interac: sets it at zero Interac: Zero  Per-transaction 
America MC* fees typical
Mexico nap nap nap nap nap nap
U.S. 7% Accel Domestic/MC: set  Increasing Increasing Some banks charge
AFFN by network  per-transaction fees
Alaska  Visa: collectively










Europe EU cross- nap MC MC: collectively set  Visa: nap nap
border Visa by members of the  Declined 
network
Visa: collectively set 
by member of the  
network subject to 
regulatory agreement
Denmark 53% Dankort Dankort: set by  Darkort: Zero  Dankort:
MC regulation  to positive to zero to 
Visa MC/Visa: aligned  zero positive to 
with MSCs, which    MC: Declined zero
are subject to  Visa: Declined MC: Declined
regulatory cap Visa: Declined.
Nether- 31% Interpay  Interpay: sets it  Interpay: Zero Declining
lands MC* at zero
Spain neg nap nap nap nap nap
Sweden 51%+ MC MC/Visa: negotiated  
Visa bilaterally
U.K. 28%+ MC MC: set by S2 Card
Visa Services 
Visa: collectively set  
by members of the 
network
Table 3: 
PIN-Based Debit Card 
Notes: 1. * denotes networks that issue cards to that country’s residents for 
international use and are available for foreigner’s use within the country
2. “+” indicates share includes signature-based transactions
3. “nap” denotes not acceptable
4. “neg” denotes negligibleNetwork Rules
No-
Region Country Surcharge HAC Net Issuer Duality Issues
1 2 9 10 11 12 13
Asia Australia Visa: Yes nap Yes Reserve Bank of Australia proposal to 
Pacific lower EFTPOS interchange fees.
North  Canada Interac: No nap MC: Yes No Some discussions over efficacy of zero 
America interchange system.
Mexico nap nap nap nap nap
U.S. MC/Visa:  nap MC: No  Yes 1. Consolidation of PIN networks.
Yes 2. Interchange fees rising in apparent 
competitive response to high and 
rising signature debit interchange fees. 
3. Appearance of “PIN” (per-transaction user) fees.
4. Appearance of volume-based interchange
fee tiers.
Europe EU cross-MC: No  nap MC: No  nap 1. Visa agreement to reduce cross-border
border Visa: Yes Visa: Yes interchange fees.
2. Visa's no-surcharge and net issuer left 
intact by EC.
3. MC’s interchange fees under EC review.
4. Exclusion provisions in Visa’s 
membership rules under EC review.
5. MC eliminated its no-surcharge rule.
Denmark Dankort: nap MC: No Yes 1. Amendment to the Payments Act 
Yes introduced positive interchange fees
on Dankort chip PIN debit transactions 
and reduced MSCs for MC and Visa
PIN transactions.
2. Debate over surcharging.
3. With the elimination of inter
change/MSC fees, annual fees for 
merchants introduced (Dankort).
Nether- No nap MC: No  nap 1. NMa fined Interpay and member 
lands banks for"charging excessive rates"; 
objection process still underway. 
2. Issuers discussing possiblity of
charging positive interchange fees for 
Interpay transactions.
Spain nap nap nap nap nap
Sweden Visa: Yes nap MC: No  Yes
U.K. Yes nap Yes Yes Switch and Solo consolidated into
MC (Maestro).
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As with credit cards and signature debit, a number of PIN debit issues
are currently under discussion (column 13). The RBA has proposed lower-
ing EFTPOS interchange fees. The EC is reviewing MasterCard’s cross-
border interchange fees. In Canada, cards from participating issuers can
now be used at U.S. merchants who belong to the NYCE network. In the
United States, merchants are dissatisfied with rising interchange fees; the
United States has seen a striking consolidation of domestic networks in
recent years, the outcome of which is still unclear. In the Netherlands, the
Competition Authority recently fined Interpay for its pricing policies,
although the objection process is still underway. And in Denmark, since
March 1, 2005, surcharging has been eliminated on Dankort transactions.
D. Public authority involvement
Virtually all central banks have general oversight responsibility for the
payments systems of their respective countries. Explicitly or implicitly,
most have a mandate to ensure that payments systems operate safely and
efficiently. As retail payments systems around the globe migrate from paper
to electronics—and, in particular, as credit and especially debit card trans-
actions become a dominant form of payment—central banks are paying
Chart 3:




















Sources: American Banker and ATM & Debit News.
Note: Adapted from Hayashi (2004), “A Puzzle of Card Payment Pricing: Why Are Merchants Still Accepting Card
Payments? Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Payments System Research working paper 04-02, p.4. The non-super-
market default rates are shown.24 Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants
increasing attention to credit and debit card industries.
In most countries, however, specific interchange fee and other payment
competition issues fall under the jurisdiction of competition (regulatory
and antitrust) authorities. There are exceptions, of course: the RBA and
Banco de México have been very visible in interchange matters, and the
Banco de España plays an important monitoring role. But for the most
part, it is the competition authorities that have taken the lead in evaluat-
ing and, at times, bringing about change in credit and debit card markets.
For the set of countries under review in this paper, this is true of Canada,
the United States, EU cross-border, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Turning to specifics, Table 4 documents various actions taken by and
pending before public authorities on interchange and related issues.
Beginning with Australia, in early 2003, the RBA eliminated credit card 
no-surcharge rules and later that year mandated that credit card interchange
fees be lowered. In early 2005, it ruled that payments between American
Express and Diners Club and their bank partners will not be regulated but
that the two companies will reword certain restrictive clauses in their 
merchant agreements. American Express and Diners Club also will be
required to publish average merchant service fees; Bankcard, MasterCard,
and Visa have been required to publish interchange fees since 2003. 
Pending issues include RBA proposals to lower EFTPOS PIN debit
interchange fees and Visa signature debit interchange fees. The RBA also
has proposed eliminating the HAC rule linking Visa’s credit and signature
debit cards. The bank will review existing regulations for credit card
schemes in 2007. The Banco de México is the other central bank that has
taken a prominent role in addressing credit and debit card issues. It has
been working with the Mexican Bankers Association to lower interchange
fees and make the HAC rule more flexible.
Among competition authorities, the European Commission in 2001
came to an agreement with Visa whereby Visa agreed to gradually reduce
its cross-border interchange fees on credit cards and signature and PIN
debit cards by December 2007. At the same time, Visa was permitted to
keep its no-surcharge, HAC, and net issuer rules. Currently pending are
EC investigations of MasterCard cross-border interchange fees and exclu-
sion provisions in Visa membership rules.
In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has been
investigating MasterCard credit card interchange fee agreements, and a
final ruling is expected in summer 2005. The OFT also has announced
plans to review Visa credit card interchange fee agreements.
 Table 4:
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Competition Authority 
Region Counry Agency Actions/Rulings
Actions/Rulings Taken Actions/Rulings Pending
12 3 4 5
Asia 
Pacific Australia Australian Competition 
and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)
North Canada Competition  Reached a Consent Agreement with the principal 
America Bureau member of Interac, which resulted in expanded
representation on the board, liberalization of 
network access rules, and removal of constraints 
on product innovation and price competition, 
including the removal of the prohibition 
against surcharging.




U.S. Department  Won court case eliminating MC and Visa 
of Justice exclusion rules that prohibited member banks 
from issuing American Express and Discover 
credit cards (10/04).
Europe EU cross- European  In “Case No COMP/29.373 Visa International 1. MC interchange
border Commission —Multilateral Interchange Fee,” fees under investigation (10/03).
(i) Visa agreed to gradually reduce cross-border  2. Exclusion provisions in Visa
interchange fees on credit card, signature debit,  membership rules under
and PIN debit transactions by December 2007 investigation (08/04).
and to publish these fees, and (ii) the EC stated 
that it had no grounds for prohibiting Visa's 
no-surcharge and net issuer rules (08/01).
Denmark Konkurrencestyrelsen  Helps administer the Danish Act on Certain
(Danish Competition  Payments (2000) and Amendment to the Act 
Authority)  (2003). The latter mandated the introduction 
of a positive interchange fee on Dankort chip 
PIN debit transactions, and a reduction in MC
and Visa PIN debit MSCs.
Netherlands Netherlands  NMa fined Interpay and member banks for 
Competition  "charging excessive rates"; objection process
Authority (NMa) still underway (2004).
Spain Servicio de Defensa  Agreements among banks, networks,  A further lowering of fees may
de la Competencia merchants, and Minsistry of the Economy  result from an April 2005 
(SDC), Tribunal de have led to reduction in credit card and ruling by the Tribunal de 
Defensa de la signature debit card interchange fees  Defensa de la Competencia.
Competencia (TDC),  since 1999. 





U.K. Office of Fair  1. OFT perfroming multiyear 
Trading (OFT) investigation on MC
interchange fees; final ruling 
expected summer 2005 
(11/04).
2. OFT announces plans to 
investigate Visa credit card 
interchange fees (11/04).Central Bank Competition
Actions/Rulings Authority/Central
Region Country Agency Actions/Rulings Taken Actions/Rulings Pending Bank Interaction 
12 6 7 8 9
Asia Australia Reserve Bank   1.  MC, Visa, Amex, 1. Proposed lowering  Conducted joint 
Pacific of Australia  and Diners Club credit card  EFTPOS PIN debit study, “Debit and 
Payments System no-surcharge rules eliminated  interchange fees (02/05). Credit Card Schemes
Board (established (01/03).     2. Proposed lowering Visa in Australia, A study
by parliment  2.  Bankcard, MC, and Visa signature debit of Interchange Fees
July 1998) lowered credit card interchange  interchange fees (02/05). and Access,” 
fees and began publishing 3. Proposed eliminating October 2000.
interchange fee levels (10/03). Visa credit card-signature  
3. Payments between Amex debit card HAC rule 
and Diners Club and  (02/05).
their bank partners will not be 4. Bank will review the
regulated; however, Amex  standards for credit card 
and Diners Club will  schemes in 2007 
reword clauses in their merchant  (02/05).
aggrements and publish average 
merchant service fees (02/05).
North Canada Bank of Canada  Limited interaction.
America 
Mexico Banco de México 1. Interchange fees have  Limited interaction. 
been reduced due to a 
concerted effort between
Banco de México and the
Mexican Bankers Association.
2. Banco de México has 
made the HAC rule more
flexible: merchants are 
allowed to accept only debit,
credit, or both cards.
3. The no-surcharge rule 
was left intact because 
discounts are already allowed.
U.S. Federal Reserve Limited interaction.
Europe EU cross- European Central  Some interaction; 
border Bank ECB can play 
advisory role.
Denmark Danmarks Limited  interaction.
Nationalbank
Netherlands De Nederlandsche  Limited interaction.
Bank 
Spain Banco de España Banco de España  TDC and Banca de 
monitoring credit card  España work 
market; first public report  together on 
due shortly. occasion.
Sweden Riksbank Limited interaction.
U.K. Bank of England Limited interaction;
Bank of England 
sits as an observer 
on joint OFT/ 
industry task force. 
26 Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants
Table 4:
Public Authority Involvement (cont.)STUART E. WEINER AND JULIAN WRIGHT 27
Competition authorities have been active elsewhere as well. In 2004, the
Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) fined Interpay and its mem-
ber banks for charging “excessive” merchant service charges, although the
objection process is still underway. Also in 2004, the U.S. Department of
Justice won a court case eliminating MasterCard and Visa exclusion rules
that prohibited member banks from issuing American Express and
Discover credit cards. Earlier actions or agreements in other countries
include: (1) the Danish Competition Authority’s administration of the
2003 Amendment to the Danish Act on Certain Payments, whereby
MasterCard and Visa PIN debit merchant service charges were reduced
and a positive (non-zero) interchange fee was introduced on Dankort chip
PIN debit card transactions; (2) the Canadian Competition Authority’s
mid-1990s Consent Agreement with the principal member of Interac,
which resulted in expanded representation on the board, liberalization of
network access rules, and removal of constraints on product innovation
and price competition, including the removal of the prohibition against
surcharging; and (3) the Spanish Ministry of the Economy’s 1999 agree-
ment with banks, networks, and merchants to lower credit card and signa-
ture debit card interchange fees.
Interaction among competition authorities and central banks on credit
and debit card issues varies across countries (column 9). In some countries,
there is some degree of consultation and occasional representation on joint
task forces—this is, or has been, true in Spain, the European Union, the
United Kingdom, and Australia, for example. In other countries, the
degree of interaction between competition authority and central bank
appears limited, at least formally. Whether closer ties will be forged in light
of the issues facing the card industry bears watching.
IV. DETERMINANTS OF INTERCHANGE FEES
Section 3 showed the considerable variation that exists across countries
in interchange fee arrangements in credit and debit card markets. Section
2 explored the potential role played by interchange fees in affecting the
structure of prices faced by cardholders and merchants in these two-sided
markets. This framework provides a natural starting point for analyzing
some of the possible determinants of interchange fees. Drawing on the eco-
nomics literature on the subject
20, this section outlines various factors
which, in theory, could affect interchange fees. It then examines some pre-
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A. Theoretical determinants
The simplest models of interchange fee determination assume that mer-
chants are nonstrategic in their decision about whether to accept cards or
not.
21 Like monopolistic merchants, these merchants accept cards only if the
(net) transactional benefits of doing so exceed the amount they have to
pay.
22 In particular, nonstrategic merchants do not consider that accepting
cards may be a way of attracting customers from rival merchants.
23 This
unrealistic assumption has been relaxed in other works, the implications of
which will be discussed below. Assuming that consumers pay the same price
regardless of whether they use a card or not, consumers hold and use cards
if the (net) transactional benefits they obtain from doing so exceed the fee
they have to pay.
24 By specifying the (net) transactional benefits to cardhold-
ers and merchants, the demand from each type of user is determined. 
In such models, a single card association sets an interchange fee to maxi-
mize some objective, such as the aggregate profits of its member, or the total
volume of card transactions. Profits are determined by the fees collected
over all cardholders and merchants, and over all their card transactions. The
nature of issuing and acquiring competition, together with the costs of issu-
ing and acquiring, then determine exactly how interchange fees feed
through into cardholder and merchant fees, and hence the number of card
transactions and profits the members attract. 
a.  Balancing considerations
Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2004) provide a formal analysis that
fits this case.
25 The interchange fee that results primarily reflects balancing
considerations. In particular, the card association seeks to maximize card
transactions by attracting the right balance of cardholder demand and mer-
chant acceptance. The choice of interchange fee will not be optimal if there
is very high demand from cardholders but few merchants that are willing
to accept cards. Similarly, interchange fees will not be optimal if there is lit-
tle demand from cardholders even though all merchants are willing to
accept cards. As a result, the key determinants of privately set interchange
fees emphasized by this framework reflect any asymmetries between the
two sides of the business. 
Specifically, Schmalensee (2002) finds higher issuing costs or demand by
merchants result in higher interchange fees, and higher acquiring costs or
demand by cardholders result in lower interchange fees. Interchange revenue
will flow to the high-cost side of the business, and to the side which has less
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demand.
26To understand this result, consider a situation where suddenly the
cost of issuing increases but other factors remain unchanged. This implies
that cardholders will face higher fees (or reduced benefits). This will reduce
the number of cardholders and the extent of card usage. All else equal, there
now will be too little demand for card usage relative to merchants that accept
cards from the perspective of a card association that seeks to maximize the
volume of card transactions. That is, to reach the balance of card usage and
merchant acceptance that maximizes the volume of card transactions and so
the profits of the members of the card association, card fees need to be
decreased relative to merchant fees. A higher interchange fee does exactly
this. A shift downward in cardholder demand has the same effect. 
In contrast, higher acquiring costs or lower merchant demand has the
opposite effect and calls for a decrease in interchange fees.
Wright (2004) finds the same results in a model in which the underlying
transactional benefits of card usage and card acceptance are specified, and
which allows merchants to accept cards for strategic reasons. In this case,
interchange fees decrease in the transactional benefits obtained by cardhold-
ers from using cards and increase in the transactional benefits obtained by
merchants of accepting cards. The transactional benefits of cardholders can
be thought of as another measure for the level of cardholder demand (and
likewise for merchants). Wright also finds that the interchange fee increases
in the price-cost margin of issuers and decreases in the price-cost margins of
acquirers. The effect of higher issuer margins is to increase card fees, and so,
like higher issuer costs, this requires higher interchange fees to optimally
balance the two sides of the market so as to maximize the volume of card
transactions and profits for the card association as a whole.
None of these models incorporates the possible use of interchange fees to
spur investment by issuers or acquirers. It is possible that interchange fees
could promote greater investment on one side of the market or another.
This arises if the pass-through of interchange fees to end users is less than
perfect so that issuers and acquirers retain some profits, and interchange
fees can affect these profits directly.
27 In this case, an increase in the inter-
change fee will increase issuers’ profits, making issuers more likely to 
promote (and possibly invest in) the development of the particular card
network. Thus, another possible explanation of what drives interchange
fees is that they are set, in part, to give incentives for investment activity
on one side relative to the other. This is just another example of the 
interchange fee acting as a balancing instrument.
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b. Shifting revenues to issuers
In addition to these balancing effects, these models also capture the 
possible use of interchange fees to shift revenues from acquirers to issuers.
This can arise for two reasons. One possibility, first raised by Schmalensee
(2002), is that issuers are more powerful members of card associations, and
so hold more voting power than acquirers in negotiating the interchange
fee. If issuers get to retain some of the higher interchange revenue obtained
from any increase in interchange fees, the card association may then end
up setting interchange fees higher than is optimal from a balancing 
perspective. Some card transactions will be sacrificed by setting an inter-
change fee that is too high (from the perspective of issuers and acquirers
jointly) so as to shift revenue to issuers. 
The second possibility, also raised by Schmalensee (2002), is that one side
of the market is more competitive than the other. The case he discusses
involves acquiring being perfectly competitive while issuing involves market
power. Rochet and Tirole (2002) also consider a similar setting. Since costs
are fully passed through on the acquiring side, but revenues are not fully
competed away on the issuing side, a higher interchange fee may generate
higher fees (in total) and so higher profits for members as a whole. Wright
(2004) notes that it is the relative degree of pass-through of interchange fees
that matters here. Even if issuing is profitable and acquiring is not, if any
increase in interchange fees results in an equal (or greater) decrease in card
fees (or increase in cardholder benefits), then issuers and acquirers do not
have any joint incentive to set high interchange fees to shift revenues to
issuers. Thus, the relative degree of pass-through by issuers and acquirers is
another potential determinant of interchange fees. As a result, the theory
predicts privately set interchange fees should increase in the extent of
acquirer pass-through and decrease in the extent of issuer pass-through.
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c. Merchant and intersystem competition
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on a model which ignores two
important types of competition. One is competition between merchants
that accept cards (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Wright, 2004). The other is
competition between different payments systems (Rochet and Tirole,
2003; Guthrie and Wright, 2003, 2005). 
Considering merchant competition first, merchants will accept cards, in
part, to attract customers from other merchants. This will increase the
amount they will be prepared to pay to accept cards above that determined
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solely from any transactional benefits they obtain from accepting cards.
From the perspective of the card association, this is like an increase in
demand from merchants. According to the result above, higher merchant
demand means the card association will want to set a higher interchange
fee. The same result applies here. When merchants accept cards for strate-
gic reasons, the interchange fee that balances demands across cardholders
and merchants, so as to maximize card volume and profits for the mem-
bers, will be higher. Essentially, if merchants have little resistance to paying
merchant fees because of their need to do so to attract customers, then card
schemes will drive higher card volumes and profits by setting relatively
high interchange fees. 
The second form of competition missing from the simple framework
above is competition with alternative payment schemes (so-called intersys-
tem competition). The effect of this form of competition on the interchange
fee that will be chosen is far from obvious. It is similar to asking whether
more competition between rival newspapers mean publishers will levy more
of their charges on readers or more on advertisers. Greater intersystem com-
petition should not increase the total fees charged across both sides of the
market. However, it is theoretically possible for greater competition to
increase or decrease the fees charged on any particular side, or leave them
unchanged. Rochet and Tirole (2003a) show that with linear demands and
nonstrategic merchants, the structure of prices (or the interchange fee) set by
a single monopoly card association can be identical to that set by two com-
peting schemes.
30 Whether interchange fees are likely to increase or decrease
with intersystem competition thus depends on other factors.
There are certain situations where greater intersystem competition is
likely to have a predictable impact on interchange fees. One situation is if
interchange fees are being used primarily to shift revenues to issuers (say
due to greater issuer bargaining power or market power). Greater intersys-
tem competition should then reduce interchange fees. This result assumes
issuers are tied to a particular card scheme and cannot move between them,
a condition reconsidered below. 
One way intersystem competition (say between MasterCard and Visa, or
between credit cards and debit cards) can raise interchange fees is if most
merchants accept both types of card and consumers typically just carry a
single type of card. Then competition will cause schemes to compete to
attract customers to hold their card exclusively, since merchants may con-
tinue to accept both cards, given they expect consumers to only hold one
type of card. This situation is one of a competitive bottleneck (Guthrie and
Wright, 2003). Thus, greater intersystem competition can cause card asso-
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ciations to increase their interchange fees. More generally, a similar result
may arise if cardholders rather than merchants ultimately determine which
card will be used.
On the other hand, competition can also have the opposite effect, if most
consumers tend to hold multiple cards. Then a merchant may want to reject
the more expensive card, knowing most consumers will still be able to pay
with the other card, which they prefer to accept. Thus, strong merchants
may be able to play one card scheme off against the other to push down
merchant fees (and interchange fees). 
Even if the role of consumers and merchants is roughly balanced in deter-
mining which card will be selected through intersystem competition, such
competition can still lead to higher interchange fees. Guthrie and Wright
(2005) find that in this case, intersystem competition, when combined with
merchant competitions, results in higher interchange fees being set than
with either form of competition on its own. Essentially, intersystem compe-
tition causes the networks to focus more on end user surplus rather than just
the number of transactions they can generate, since the network that can
offer the most to users will dominate. Merchant competition results in the
surplus of cardholders being weighted more highly, which implies a higher
interchange fee will be set when networks compete. If strong issuers can play
one card association off against another, the result of intersystem competi-
tion may be to drive up interchange fees.
Given intersystem competition can, in theory, either increase or decrease
interchange fees, it becomes an empirical issue as to the actual impact of inter-
system competition on interchange fees. Likewise, the role of cost and
demand asymmetries, as well as issuer and acquirer pass-through rates (and
market power), are other factors that potentially can be explored empirically. 
B. Preliminary empirical evidence
Unfortunately, the lack of any systematic data on interchange fees limits
a serious empirical analysis of these issues. Perhaps for this reason, there is
no existing empirical analysis of the determinants of interchange fees. Here
the analysis is restricted to exploring whether there is any simple relation-
ship between interchange fees and issuer (or system) market concentration.
A positive relationship between interchange fees and issuer market concen-
tration is predicted by balancing considerations (Section 4.1.1) and also, so
as to shift revenues to issuers (Section 4.1.2), assuming higher issuer con-
centration corresponds to higher market power. On the other hand, eco-
nomic theory predicts intersystem competition can either increase or
decrease interchange fees. 
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In Figure 1, the most recently available credit card interchange fees for
20 selected countries are plotted against a measure of issuer concentration
(a proxy for issuer market power). The countries included are all available
countries in Asia Pacific (obtained on the basis of confidentially from Visa
International) in addition to Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, for which data was obtained from
various sources. For the case of Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the
interchange fee was taken at pre-regulation levels to avoid distorting the
results. Issuer market concentration is measured as the value of card trans-
actions handled by the five largest issuers divided by the total value of card
transactions. For Asia Pacific countries, all variables are measured for the
Visa network alone. For the remaining countries, the variables include data
from both the MasterCard and Visa networks.
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Figure 1 reveals that there is no obvious relationship between issuer 
market concentration and interchange fees across the sample of countries con-
sidered. In fact, the correlation between the two variables is somewhat nega-
tive (-0.36), contrary to expectations of a positive relationship. This could
simply be because issuer concentration does not proxy at all for issuer market
power. Even if issuer concentration does proxy for issuer market power, the
finding does not rule out that such a relationship exists. Rather, it implies that
any relationship must be more complex, involving several factors that deter-
Figure 1: 
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3mine interchange fees, such as the “balancing” factors identified in this 
section, as well as the many country-specific factors documented in
Section 3. Unless these other factors are controlled for, the true effect of
issuer concentration on interchange fees cannot be uncovered. 
The relationship between interchange fees and the difference between
issuing concentration and acquiring concentration tells a similar story, as
Figure 2 demonstrates.
32 Figure 2 also reveals that acquiring is somewhat
more concentrated than issuing for the majority of countries considered.
This seems at odds with the assumption used in some of the theoretical
work in which issuers were assumed to have market power but not acquir-
ers.
33 Of course, other factors than market concentration can determine
market power. The fact acquirers have to negotiate with large retailers in
private suggests they may be more competitive than concentration meas-
ures alone imply. 
Figure 3 considers the relationship between a measure of system con-
centration and interchange fees. It shows that there is also no obvious rela-
tionship between interchange fees and the proportion of card transactions
(in value terms) that Visa conducts compared to Visa and MasterCard
34 Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants
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together. Those countries where Visa and MasterCard equally share the
market have no higher interchange fees (on average) than those where
Visa attracts most of the business. Thus, the relative size of Visa to
MasterCard does not seem to be related to the average level of interchange
fees, unless it is part of a more complicated relationship.
Time series data on individual countries are largely lacking. One country
for which there are some data is the United States. Figure 4 gives a time
series plot of U.S. interchange fees and issuer concentration from 1990 to
2002. Interchange fees are averages for Visa consumer credit cards (from
Visa U.S.A.), while issuer concentration measures the share of the top five
issuers of MasterCard and Visa (in value terms) out of all MasterCard and
Visa issuers (from Nilson reports).
34 Figure 4 reveals an up-trend in both the
top-five-issuer concentration measure and average interchange fees, consis-
tent with a positive relationship between the two variables. 
In comparison to cross-country data, looking at a single country across
time may better control for other factors (such as the relative costs of issu-
ing and acquiring, the extent of perceived cardholder and merchant ben-
efits, and the availability of substitute instruments). Looking at the U.S
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data is also particularly interesting since there has been a fair bit of varia-
tion in the series over the available sample. In particular, there was a fair-
ly substantial increase in the market share of the largest issuers from the
mid-1990s onward, largely reflecting merger and acquisition activity.
Consistent with the time-series pattern evident from Figure 4, the average
interchange fee is highly correlated with issuer concentration over this peri-
od.
35 There are several possible explanations for this. The first, based on the
“balancing” approach, is that in facing higher issuer concentration and
price-cost margins, it is optimal for card associations to set a higher inter-
change fee so that card fees do not increase (or cardholder benefits do not
fall) by the full extent of the higher issuing margins. A second possible
explanation is that shifting revenues to the issuing side through higher inter-
change fees becomes more attractive (or feasible) in the face of higher issuer
concentration.
36 A third explanation, consistent with intersystem competi-
tion resulting in higher interchange fees, is that higher issuer 
concentration results in more powerful issuers that can put pressure on
competing networks to set higher interchange fees with the threat of 
moving their business to a rival network if they do not. Of course, a final
possibility is that the relationship is spurious, and that with the addition of
more data points, the relationship will disappear. 
It is feasible to test between these different possibilities by looking at how
Figure 4: 
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the nature of issuer competition and profitability changed over this period.
Interestingly, the period over which issuer concentration increased has
been associated with signs of increased competition in credit card issuing
(not less). This tends to rule out both the balancing explanation for 
higher interchange fees and that shifting revenues to issuers became more 
profitable for issuers and acquirers jointly. Consistent with this conclusion
is the fact that while the market share of the five largest issuers increased
over the period, disparities between the largest issuers actually decreased.
For instance, the largest issuer, Citigroup, had a market share in 2003 that
was virtually the same as it was in 1990 (close to 18 percent). In compari-
son, the second-largest issuer in 1990 had a market share of just over 5 per-
cent. By 2003, the second-largest issuer had a market share of over 14 per-
cent. In fact, replacing the top-five-issuer concentration measure with the
more robust HHI measure, which is calculated using data for the 20 largest
issuers, reveals a quite different picture of what has happened to issuer con-
centration over this period.
37 As shown in Figure 5, in using this measure,
there is only a weak (at best) positive relationship between issuer concen-
tration and interchange fees.
38
The possibility that the increased size of the top issuers over the period
Figure 5: 
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has increased their negotiating power within the card associations cannot be
ruled out with the available data. This could work in tandem, with the 
relatively strong intersystem competition in the United States, card associa-
tions may have raised interchange fees to keep large issuers from moving
their business across to rival networks. This possibility might help explain
why the United States has seen increasing interchange fees even as other
countries have seen declines.
39 It is also consistent with the increase in debit
card interchange fees in recent years, as the networks increasingly compete
to attract large issuers of these instruments to stay on their systems.
Moreover, consistent with this explanation, each of the episodes in which
interchange fees have jumped up in the United States has been associated
with a battle to keep issuers. In 1990-1991, there was a rise in large non-
bank issuers that the networks sought to attract; in 1998-1999, there was
the realignment of Citibank’s business to MasterCard; and from 2003 to
2004, American Express has increasingly been courting existing MasterCard
and Visa issuers by offering the equivalent of higher interchange fees.
40
Overall, the results suggest that, consistent with the recent theories of
interchange fees, interchange fees will be determined by multiple factors,
so that to properly explain them will require a multivariate approach. The
cross-country data reject the simplistic notion that the level of interchange
fees is solely a reflection of the market concentration of issuers. For the
United States, there is evidence of a positive correlation between the mar-
ket share of the largest issuers and interchange fees over time. However, evi-
dence on issuer competition and a more robust HHI measure of issuer
concentration over the same period suggests that the reason for this posi-
tive correlation, if it is real, is not likely due simply to variation in the mar-
ket power of issuers. Rather, it seems that the increasing ability of large
issuers to play one network off against another to raise interchange fees
may provide a more fruitful avenue for explaining the finding.
V. CLOSING REMARKS
Interchange fees and related issues in credit and debit card markets have
been the focus of considerable attention in recent years. The academic
community has begun to address the economics of these markets. Public
officials have begun to address the policy implications of developments in
these markets. Meanwhile, these markets continue to experience dynamic
change as credit, and especially debit, transactions account for an ever-
growing share of overall payments.
This paper provides an overview of interchange fee developments and
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issues in a number of countries. It also presents a preliminary analysis of
some possible contributing factors. The overriding conclusion of the paper
is that interchange arrangements vary considerably across countries, and
while existing economic theory provides some insight into fee levels and
movements, much remains to be explained. A number of complex and
interrelated factors, many country-specific, play a role in interchange
developments. Researchers and policy authorities alike need richer data
sources to more deeply study and examine these markets.
Looking ahead, credit and debit card markets undoubtedly will continue
to evolve. If history is any guide, developments in one country may 
differ markedly from developments in others. The challenge before all inter-
ested parties—industry participants, academics, the regulatory community,
and central bankers—will be to be in a position to adequately understand
these changes.
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ENDNOTES
1American Express has increasingly been relying on issuing its card through
banks, in which case it makes a payment to these banks for the cardholders (or card
transactions) they generate, a payment akin to an interchange fee. 
2An exception is signature debit transactions in the United States, where
consumers sometimes earn rebates.
3A recent literature has studied the economics of two-sided markets. See, for
instance, Evans (2003a, 2003b), Rochet and Tirole (2004a, 2004b), and Wright
(2004) for descriptions of a wide range of two-sided markets and some discussion of
the relevant literature and policy issues. See Armstrong (2004), Caillaud and Jullien
(2003), and Rochet and Tirole (2003a) for general models of two-sided markets. 
4It is true, of course, that in some cases the interchange fee accounts for a large
percentage of the merchant fee; for example, in the United States, roughly 75
percent, and in Sweden, 100 percent. In the latter case, the interchange fee will
exactly match the price merchants pay for the acquiring service. However, since
cardholder fees are inversely related to the interchange fee, this does not change the
fact that the interchange fee determines the structure of prices to the two sides of
the market.
5 Of course, there is nothing stopping the transfer being from issuers to acquir-
ers, which implies a negative interchange fee is set. This is the case for Australian
EFTPOS transactions. 
6 Some authors have suggested interchange fees may not be able to be used in this
way, since if merchants are charged more as a result of higher interchange fees,
merchants will pass these costs on to cardholders, who will then be no better off
even though they face lower card fees. See Gans and King (2003) for an analysis of
the conditions under which interchange fees are neutral. Frankel (1998) noted that
interchange fees would not be neutral even if merchants are allowed to surcharge in
this way, due to what he called “price coherence”—the fact that most merchants
will not want to discriminate their prices between card and non-card users for small
differentials in costs. 
7 By the same logic, a higher interchange fee can also decrease the overall level of
fees, when, as a result, issuers decrease their card fees more than acquirers increase
their fees to merchants. Which situation arises in practice depends upon, among
other things, the degree of competition among issuers versus among acquirers, as
well as the degree of substitution between the different means of payment from the
perspective from both types of users. 
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8 For institutional background on the payment card industry in various countries,
see Bank for International Settlements (2003); European Central Bank (2001);
Evans and Schmalensee (2005a); and Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003).
9 “Credit cards” includes charge cards as well as deferred debit transactions.
10 In Spain, charge card transactions are predominant. 
11 In addition, in many countries, MasterCard members are permitted to
negotiate interchange fees bilaterally.
12 A further lowering of fees may result from an April 2005 ruling by the Tribunal
de Defensa de la Competencia.
13 In Europe, the term “honor-all-cards rule” is typically defined differently,
namely, if a merchant accepts a MasterCard/Visa-branded credit card issued by
Bank A, the merchant must also accept a MasterCard/Visa-branded credit card
issued by Bank B, and, similarly, if a merchant accepts a MasterCard/Visa-branded
PIN debit card issued by Bank A, the merchant must also accept a
MasterCard/Visa-branded PIN debit card issued by Bank B. Thus, in Europe,
HAC rules typically do not tie debit cards to credit cards.
14 Although MasterCard allows surcharging in Spain, the three domestic card
networks do not.
15 These networks also process MasterCard and Visa credit card and debit
card transactions.
16 After rising in 2004, some signature interchange fees were lowered in April
2005. Most remain above post-settlement levels, however.
17 In many cases, MasterCard and Visa PIN debit cards are co-branded with
domestic schemes, and routing priority is given to the latter.
18 A further review of Dankort fees is possible by summer 2005.
19 As noted in footnote 16,after rising in 2004, some signature interchange fees
were lowered in April 2005. Most remain above post-settlement levels, however.
20 Specifically, see the publications of Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee
(2002), and Wright (2004), who offer models of how interchange fees are deter-
mined in the case of a single card association. See Rochet and Tirole (2003a) and
Guthrie and Wright (2003) for equivalent models in the case of competing
payment schemes. Baxter (1983) provides a much earlier analysis of interchange
fees, but his analysis is normative rather than positive, and so he does not provide
a theory of the determinants of interchange fees. Rochet (2003) provides a synthe-
sis of these and other theories. For more general surveys see Chakravorti (2003) and
Hunt (2003).
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21 For instance, Baxter (1983) and Schmalensee (2002) implicitly make
this assumption.
22 Net transactional benefits are defined as the benefits of conducting a transac-
tion with a payment card (for example, payment guarantees, immediate fund
availability) less the difference between the benefits and costs of conducting a trans-
action with alternative payment types, for example, cash and checks and
accompanying handling and fraud costs. Note the theory allows the possibility that
merchants obtain negative net benefits of accepting cards, although without the
strategic motivation for accepting cards, these merchants would not be willing to
pay any positive merchant fee. 
23 This is plausible if merchants do not face competition for their services, or if most
of the merchant’s customers are one-off and do not know whether the particular
merchant accepts cards before deciding whether to purchase at its premises. 
24 Net transactional benefits are defined as the benefits consumers obtain from
using cards (for example, convenience) less the difference between the benefits and
costs of using alternative payment types, for example, cash and checks and accom-
panying time and risk-of-theft costs.
25 Schmalensee’s model is based on merchants being nonstrategic, while Wright
allows merchants to accept cards for strategic reasons.
26 This implies that the interchange fee will, other things equal, tend to balance
the costs of issuers and acquirers. However, it is important to note that this is not
equivalent to the view sometimes taken that interchange fees are needed by issuers
to recoup their higher costs. Even with a zero interchange fee, issuers will cover their
cost, in equilibrium by charging cardholders more. Rather, the point of equalizing
issuers’ and acquirers’ costs emphasized by the balancing approach is to achieve the
appropriate structure of cardholder and merchant fees from the perspective of the
card association.
27 Of course, interchange fees also affect the profits of issuers and acquirers indi-
rectly by influencing the demand from cardholders and merchants and so the
volume of card transactions.
28 If, alternatively, lower price-cost margins lead firms to innovate in order to
maintain margins, then a lower interchange fee could be used to spur such innova-
tion in issuing relative to acquiring.
29 This assumes at least one side enjoys positive economic profits. If both sides
obtain no economic profit regardless of the interchange fee, then there is no value
in shifting revenue from one side to the other, and, in fact, the level of the inter-
change fee is then indeterminate. In this case, it may be that the organization which
runs the card association will still want to set the interchange fee to maximize the
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volume of card transactions so as to increase the number of transactions it can
process (and therefore its revenue). 
30 Guthrie and Wright (2005) show that once merchants are strategic, this result
no longer holds, and intersystem competition will generally affect the interchange
fee in one direction or another. This result is discussed below.
31 Given the size of the Visa network in Asia Pacific, and the similarity of the
issuers of the two networks, Visa numbers are likely to be reasonable proxies for the
average interchange fee and market concentration measures obtained for Master-
Card and Visa taken together.
32 Acquirer concentration is measured in the same way as issuer concentration.
The data for Canada, Mexico, and Spain is not available for this variable, so the
three countries are eliminated from the sample.
33 It is also somewhat at odds with the claim that issuers have more power than
acquirers in setting interchange fees. 
34 Using Visa’s interchange fee rather than a weighted average of interchange fees
for MasterCard and Visa is unlikely to change Figure 4 much. MasterCard’s inter-
change fee is likely to have moved in a similar way over the time period. 
35 Even with only 14 observations, the relationship appears statistically significant.
A simple regression of interchange fees on a constant and the issuer concentration
measure gives a coefficient on issuer concentration of 1.06, with a t-stat of 9.11. This
simple regression predicts that the interchange fee in the absence of issuer concen-
tration is 0.99. However, there are potential statistical problems with such an
analysis, reflecting the possibility of the series being nonstationary, concerns that are
not easily addressed with such a small sample. When the series are first-differenced
(to eliminate the apparent nonstationarity in each), the relationship is no longer
statistically significant. 
36 Recall there are two possible ways this can occur—either since issuers and
acquirers together are better off shifting revenues to issuers, since with higher
concentration, issuers compete away less revenue (this makes raising interchange
fees more attractive), or since issuers become more powerful within the card asso-
ciation in terms of negotiating their preferred interchange fee (this makes raising
interchange fees feasible).
37 HHI is defined as the sum of squared market shares of each of the firms (when
market shares are expressed as percentages). An HHI of 10,000 represents the case
of a monopoly. Markets with an HHI above 1,800 are generally considered concen-
trated by the Department of Justice in the United States. Since issuers below the
top 20 are ignored (as are other schemes that issue cards), using only the top 20
MasterCard and Visa issuers means that the HHI measure used here will signifi-
cantly overstate the true level of market concentration in the industry. On the other
 44 Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants
hand, to the extent that some of the smaller issuers only serve local geographic
markets, it may be appropriate to ignore some of these issuers. In any case, replac-
ing the HHI measure, with the HHI calculated assuming all smaller card issuers are
of equal size, does not materially change the result. 
38 A similar result emerges if the HHI of the top 20 issuers is replaced by the
difference between the HHI of the top 10 issuers less that of the top 10 acquirers.
This particular definition is used to maximize available data points, although 1990
and 1992-1994 remain missing. The data are again from selected Nilson Reports.
39 Of course, interchange fees have been subject to regulatory limits in some coun-
tries, as documented in section 3.
40 For further discussion, see, for example, Evans and Schmalensee (2005a).
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